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IN THE SUPRE!1E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ELSA H. NIXDORF,
PlaintiffAppellant,
vs.

No. 16151

N. FREDERICK HICKEN and
A. JAMES 11cALLISTER,
DefendantsRespondents.

BRIEF OF

0

ESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a medical malpractice action in which the
plaintiff complains that a suturing needle was lost in her
abdomen during an operation performed in 1964 and that
the incident was not disclosed to her.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court directed a verdict for the defendants
at the close of the plaintiff's evidence.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek affirmance of the judgment.
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EXPLANATORY STATEMENT
The parties will be described as they appeared in
the trial court.

Defendants concede that this Court

must review the evidence in the light most favorable
to plaintiff, who has appealed from a directed verdict.
This does not mean, however, that the Court should
be asked to ignore undisputed facts favorable to the
defendants (Toma v. Utah Power & Light Co.

(1961),

12 Utah 2d 278, 365 P.2d 788), nor is it proper to
select portions of testimony on direct examination
without considering the effect of cross-examination.
As this Court said in Alvarado v. Tucker (1954), 2 Utah 2d
16, 268 P. 2c 986:
The rule is familiar that "testimony of a
witness on his direct examination is no
stronger than as modified or left by his
further examination or by his crossexamination. A particular part of his
testimony may not be singled out to the
exclusion of other parts of equal
importance bearing on the subject."
Since defendants believe that plaintiff's statement
of facts does violence to the principles of the cited cases,
and is also argumentative, defendants submit their own
statement of facts:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff first sought treatment from Dr. Hicken,
a specialist in surgery, on June 2, 1964, just before her
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-2- by the Utah State Library.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sixtieth birthday

(R 128).

For ten years the

plaintiff had suffered from a condition of stretched,
weakened and ruptured muscles in her pelvic diaphragm
that support the internal organs in the abdominal
cavity (R 129-30).

The plaintiff's condition had

progressed to such advanced stage that her uterus,
bladder and rectum, unsupported by muscle tissues,
had collapsed through the vagina (R 130-31).

Portions

of these organs had protruded through the vaginal opening
and were hanging externally between the plaintiff's
legs (R 130-31).

She was admitted to the L.D.S. Hospital

for surgery to return the organs to their proper places,
to repair the heavy muscle structures that support them,
and to excise portions of the cervix that had become
inflammed by chafing and rubbing against her clothes and
legs (R l38-39).
The surgical procedure Dr. Hicken employed required
him to enter the abdominal cavity through the vagina.
The vagina was retracted to the extent possible to allow
access and visibility to the area and a circular incision
was made at the posterior end (R 149).

After tissues

that separate the vagina from the rectum were cut back,
the bladder was repositioned in its proper place and
muscle tissues were sutured together to secure the organ
(R 196-97).

Dr. Hicken then proceeded to the second

stage of the operation in which he repositioned the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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rectum and began suturing heavy muscle structures
deep inside the abdominal cavity.
Working through the vagina, Dr. Hicken positioned
the rectum in its proper place and located the torn
bundles oi muscle on each side of the structure that
had to be sutured together to form a supportive sling
(R 150).

Since it is impossible to see the suturing

needle while it is drawn through the tissue and since
in many of these areas the surgeon is required to rely
solely on his sense of touch, special instruments were
used to facilitate the manipulation of needles and
sutures (R 137).
Dr. Hicken testified that the

s~all,

curved suturing

needles were threaded by a surgical nurse and clamped
in needle forceps which were then handed to the surgeon
(R 137).

By manipulating the forceps, the needle is placed

through muscle tissue and rotated until the point protrudes sufficiently to be grasped by a hemostat (R 159).
The surgeon then uses the hemostat to pull the needle and
suture through the tissue.

The suture is then cut and

the needle which is still secured by the hemostat is
handed to the surgical nurse and the process is repeated
(R 159).

Once

sutur~s

have been placed on both sides of

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the torn muscles, the sutures are drawn together, tied and
the ends of the muscles are sewn together around the
rectum (R 159).
While Dr. Hicken was using the needle forceps to
insert and rotate the needle through muscle tissue, the
needle slipped from the forceps and was lost (R 217).
The forceps were still locked when Dr. Hicken withdrew
the instrument without the needle (R 220).

Dr. Hicken

explained the loss as follows:
A

You are getting a bite of tissue -you are corning down and getting a
bite of tissue -- you see, here's a
rachet that locks it.
I showed you
yesterday. Now, when you are sewing,
you do not have your fingers in these
openings of the ratchet. You take
your hand out and put it against the
palm here using this finger to
give you a little force and a directional
mechanism for the point of the needle and
you come around like this.
Now, sometimes
you hit heavy muscles, sometimes you have
thinner muscles, sometimes you have scar
tissue.
If the bladder and things have
been out too long, that tissue has been
irritated and there is a lot of scar
tissue until you get some resistance in
bringing the needle through and it's
very easy for the -- possible that the
needle, being in oil and blood and fatty
tissue down there, too, that the needle
could rotate and slip out. When we bring
the needle -- when we brought the needle
holder out it was still locked and the
needle wasn't in it so that's why you
assume that the needle was broken or lost.

Q

Do you have any opinion as to whether it
came off because of the fats and blood
and oil from the tissues or from some
other reason?

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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A

No, I think it's -- the oil and the blood
lubricates it and makes it easier to
rotate out and the fact we had heavy
tissue to work with and all of these
caused the needle to rotate and slip
(R 220-21).

Dr. Hicken palpated muscle tissues in the area of
the operative site, but he was unable to locate the
needle (R 221).

Further efforts were not undertaken because

in those days, X-ray equipment was in the basement of the
hospital and was not available in the operating room,
because Dr. Hicken did not wish to prolong the procedure
in view of the plaintiff's age and health and because
he knew that a needle left in the muscles in this area
would not be harmful to the patient (R 214).
Dr. Hicken reported the loss of the needle in the
operative report which became part of the hospital chart
of the patient's care, but decided against alarming the
plaintiff by advising her of its presence.

Dr. Hicken

testified that he considered several factors in making
the decision.

First, he did not expect the needle to

cause any physical harm inasmuch as its presence would
be as innocuous as metal surgical clips that are often
used instead of sutures in the abdominal area (R 214).
Second, in Dr. Hicken's judgment, the plaintiff was an
emotional, nervous and worrisome individual who might
become unduly alarmed,particularly in view of her limited
understanding of the English language which made it diffiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
cult for
comprehend
medical
(R 222).
Library her
Servicesto
and Technology
Act, administered
by the Utahproblems
State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6-

Finally, the plaintiff was hypertensive and an unreasonable
concern about the condition would be expected to elevate
her blood pressure even higher (R 222).

In short, no

purpose beneficial to the patient would have been served
by such a disclosure and the information could have been
detrimental to the patient's mental and physical health
(R 222-23).
Although the plaintiff testified that she has suffered
pain in her abdomen and in her back that the attributes
to the needle, no expert testimony was offered to show
that the needle proximately caused any damage.

To the

contrary, the plaintiff's present physician, Dr. Robert
Maddock, testified that the pain in her abdomen was
secondary to a kidney stone in the right ureter (R 168).
He also believes that the needle was not responsible for
the plaintiff's back pain (R 185).

Dr. Maddock testified

that it is medically probable that the needle is encapsulated
by surrounding tissue that prevents the needle from moving
and causing any harm or discomfort (R 181).

Dr. Maddock

discovered the needle during X-ray tests performed in
August, 1976, and while conducting a pelvic examination
he subsequently identified a smooth nodule that contains
the needle between the vagina and the rectum (R 170, 175).
He testified that the plaintiff exhibited no pain response
whatsoever when he and his consulting surgeon probed the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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area in which the needle is located (R 180).

He

recommended that the needle not be removed since the
chances of its causing any damage were "very remote"
(R 183), and his consulting surgeon concurred.
At the close of

the~aintiff's

evidence, the trial

court concluded that Dr. Hicken's explanation of the
circumstances under which the needle was lost rebutted
any inference of negligence and, in the absence of expert
testimony showing a breach of the standard of care, the
plaintiff had failed to prove negligence.

The court also

concluded that the plaintiff had failed to prove that
the needle was the proximate cause of any damage.

For

those reasons, defendants' motion for directed verdict was
granted.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
TO SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE JURY ON THE ISSUE
OF NEGLIGENCE
The plaintiff alleges that Dr. Hicken breached his
duty to exercise ordinary care during
two ways.

~he

operation in

First, although the precise reason why the

suturing needle was lost remains unknown, she claims the
fact that it was lost is sufficiently indicative of
negligence to submit the issue to the jury on the basis
of res ipsa loquitur.

Second, the plaintiff complains

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that Dr. Hicken negligently failed to undertake additiona! measures to locate the needle before concluding
the surgery.

No expert testimony was offered in support

of either contention.
This Court has recognized that under limited circumstances and upon sufficient evidentiary foundation,
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may apply to medical
care.

Talbot v. Dr. W. H. Groves' Latter Day Saints

Hospital, 21 Utah 2d 73, 440 P.2d 872 (1968).

The Court

has correctly recognized, however, that the doctrine
must be cautiously applied especially in the field of
medicine where untoward consequences may occur despite
the highest degree of skill, care and attention.

The

Court stated in Joseph v. W. H. Groves' Latter Day Saints
Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P.2d 935 (1960):
It is recognized that res ipsa loquitur
has been applied in various field where
an injury occurs which is not to be
expected if proper standards of care
and skill are observed.
But this is done
only with caution, particularly in the
medical field because of the realization
that many aspects of the treatment of
human ills cannot be regarded as exact
science and a bad result may obtain even
though recognized standards of care and
skill are employed. 348 P.2d at 938
(Emphasis added.)
As a foundational requirement for the application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff was required

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology
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to show more than the mere fact that the suturing needle
became detached from the forceps during the operation.
Rather, the plaintiff had the burden of proving that
such an event would probably not have occurred if Dr.
Hicken had observed proper standards of care and skill.
In Talbot, the Court emphasized this foundational
requirement as follows:
The fact that plaintiff's disability
resulted from an uncommon or rare
occurrence does not relieve him of
the burden of establishing causation.
An inference of negligence cannot be
permitted solely upon the basis that
the plaintiff developed a rare complication while undergoing medical and surgical treatment.
The doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur has no application unless
it can be shown from past experience
that the occurrence causing the dis
ability is more likely the result of
negligence than some other cause.
440
P.2d at 873 (Emphasis added.)
Whether the trial court was justified in refusing to
submit the case on the theory of res ipsa loquitur accordingly
requires consideration of two issues:

First, was the

occurrence more likely the result of ne9ligence than
some other cause; and second, was the defendant's
conduct in relation to the occurrence explained in such
a manner as to preclude any reasonable finding of
negligence on his part.

Joseph v. W. H. Groves' Latter

Day Saints Hospital, supra, at 937; Talbot v. W. H.
Groves' Latter Day Saints Hospital, supra, at 873.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,-10administered by the Utah State Library.
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In the present case, the plaintiff offered no
evidence of any kind that the first event complained
of, i.e., detachment of the suturing needle from
the forceps, was more probably than not the result of
negligence.

Dr. Hicken's choice of the surgical techni-

que that required use of special instruments to suture
heavy muscles deep in the abdominal cavity was never
challenged.

The plaintiff also offered no evidence that

the suturing instruments and needles Dr. Hicken selected
and, more importantly, the technique he employed in using
them failed in any way to conform to the standard of
care required of him.

It was undisputed that Dr. Hicken

was unable to visualize all of the areas in which sutures
were made (R 138), that the tissues through which he had
to draw the needle were thick, often scarred and resistant
to penetration (R 220-21), and that Dr. Hicken had to
rely solely upon the suturing forceps that were lubricated with blood and body fats and oils to secure and
manipulate the needle (R 220-21).
Under these circumstances, the trial court was
compelled to find and properly held that it was not within
the common knowledge of laymen to say that loss of the
needle necessarily implied negligence or lack of due
care on the part of Dr. Hicken.

The trial court's ruling

is consistent with a number of decisions where appellate
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.
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courts have considered similar fact situations.
In Tomei v. Henning, 62 Ca. Rptr. 9 431 P.2d 633 (1967),
cited with approval by the Utah Court in Talbot, the
California Supreme Court considered a malpractice action
against a physician who accidentally sutured the right
ureter of a patient in two places during a hysterectomy.
The Court stated:
Since the question whether, in the light
of past experience, the accident in this
case was probably the result of negligence
is not a matter of common knowledge among
laymen, expert testimony is necessary to
determine whether a probability of
negligence appears from the happening of
the accident.
431 P.2d at 635.
In Steinmetz v. Humphrey, 289 Ky. 709, 160 S.W.2d 6
(1942), the Court affirwed a directed verdict in favor
of a physician who was charged with malpractice because
two surgical needles were broken and lost in the wound
during an operation.

The Court held that expert medical

testimony was necessary to establish sufficient foundation
for application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and in
doing so distinguished cases where surgical sponges and other
materials are inadvertently not removed from an incision at
the conclusion of an operation.
Smith, 114 F.2d 494

Similarly, in Hohenthal v.

(D.C. Cir. 1940), the Court affirmed

a directed verdict in favor of a physician in a broken
needle case.

The Court held that expert testimony was

necessary to establish sufficient foundation to apply the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and stated:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12-

We cannot say as matter of law that the
mere leaving of the needle in the
patient's body under the circumstances
shown by the evidence was sufficient
to sustain a verdict of negligence . .
114 F.2d at 497.
The plaintiff also failed to offer any evidence that
the standard of care applicable to Dr. Hicken in 1964
required use of X-ray equipment or other means to locate
the needle after he had palpated muscle tissues in the
area of the operative site.

Dr. Hicken testified that

15 years ago X-ray equipment was kept in the basement of
the hospital and, in his medical judgment, prolonging the
procedure while equipment was brought to the operating room
would have created an unnecessary risk to the plaintiff
who was elderly and not in the best physical

cc~dition.

The propriety of Dr. Hicken's decision under these circumstances is clearly not within the common knowledge of
laymen and the trial court correctly so held.

Cf.

Hohenthal v. Smith, 114 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1940);
Steinmetz v. Humphrey, 289 Ky. 709, 160 S.W.2d 6 (1942);
Emery v. Fisher, 148 A. 677 (Me. 1930).

As this Court

stated in Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d
1108 (1959):
In the absence of a standard of care
established by expert medical testimony
and some evidence showing a deviation
from this standard, it must be presumed
that the physician skillfully operated
on and treated the plaintiff.
To allow
the question of negligence to be submitted
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
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to the jury without first establishing
a standard of care would allow a jury
to indulge in a type of speculation
not generally allowed.
347 P.2d at 1111.
Even if the loss of the suturing needle and Dr.
Hicken's failure to recover it give rise to an inference
of negligence, the trial court correctly held that Dr.
Hicken's explanation of the events precluded any
reasonable finding of negligence on his part.

Dr.

Hicken testified that the forceps were still in a locked
position when he withdrew the instrument without the
needle (R 220).

In view of that uncontradicted fact,

the plaintiff's speculation that Dr. Hicken might have
prematurely released the needle by opening the forceps is
both illogical and contrary to the evidence.

The fact

that Dr. Hicken was attempting to insert the needle through
heavy and resistant muscle tissue with an instrument that
was lubricated with blood and body fats and oils makes
his explanation of the loss the only reasonable conclusion.
Since there is no suggestion in the evidence that there
were any precautions against the loss which Dr. Hicken might
have employed while using the forceps, any inference of
negligence disappears.

See, e.g., Joseph v. W. H. Groves'

Latter Day Saints Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P.2d 935
(1960).

In a closely analogous case, Justice Roscoe Pound

in Benson v. Dean, 232 N.Y. 52, 133 N.E. 125 (1921), stated
the rule as follows:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Common sense suggests that the condition
discovered by Dr. Saphir was incompatible
with successful surgery and medical treatment.
But when the evidence of the defendant's surgeons carne into the case with a
reasonable explanation showing what may
happen when the proper degree of care and
skill is actually exercised, the possible
inference of negligence from the breaking
of the needle alone was driven out and the
jury should have been so instructed. The
rule res ipsa loquitur put upon the
defendant the burden of going on with the
case, but in the absence of medical evidence
to the contrary, it must be assumed on this
appeal that the breaking of the needle
was not due to negligence.
232 N.Y. at 58
(Citations omitted).
Since the plaintiff failed to present sufficient
evidence to submit the case to the jury on the issue of
negligence, the trial court properly granted the defendant's
motion for a directed verdict in their favor.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE DEFENDANTS
EXERCISED APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT IN NOT ADVISING THE
PLAINTIFF OF THE PRESENCE OF THE NEEDLE.
All courts recognize "the physician's duty to reveal
to the patient that which in his best interest it is
important that he should know."

Emmett v. Eastern Dispensary

& Cas. Hosp., 396 F.2d 931, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1967).

The

physician's primary duty, however, is to do what is best for
the patient.

For that reason, the courts uniformly recognize

an exception to the duty of disclosure in cases where
sound medical judgment indicates that disclosure would
be detrimental to the patient's welfare.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Haw. 188, 473 P.2d 116
(1970), the Court affirmed a motion to dismiss an
action against a physician who had not disclosed known
risks attendant to a diagnostic surgical procedure
The defendant testified that he thought full disclosure
would not be in the patient's best medical interest in
view of the following psychological conditions as related
by the attending physician:
This man was very well-educated, a fine
man, but, in addition, he was very
frightened about his condition, he was
apprehensive, and this actually guided
our hand in much of what we did because
if a man has a serious heart disease,
with hypertension, and you thereupon
frighten him further, you have a problem
which you have created.
473 P.2d at
120.
The Court recognized that the doctrine of informed consent
imposes upon a physician a duty to disclose to the patient
all relevant information concerning a proposed treatment,
but stated:
However, the doctrine recognizes that the
primary duty of a physician is to do what
is best for his patient and that a
physician may withhold disclosure of
information regarding any untoward consequences of a treatment where full disclosure
will be detrimental to the patient's total
care and best interest.
Id. at 119.
The Court held that a dismissal was proper because the
medical standard, as established by the defendant's
testimony, was that a competent and responsible medical
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practitionerwould not disclose information which
might induce an adverse psychosomatic reaction in a
patient highly apprehensive of his condition.
Similarly, in Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772
(D.C. Cir. 1972), the Court recognized an exception to
the duty of disclosure when risk-disclosure poses such a
threat of detriment to the patient as to become unfeasible
or contraindicated from a medical point of view.

The

Court stated:
It is recognized that patients occasionally
become so ill or emotionally distraught
on disclosure as to foreclose a rational
decision, or complicate or hinder the
treatment, or perhaps even pose psychological
damage to the patient. Where that is so,
the cases have generally held that the
physician is armed with a privilege to
keep the information from the patient, and
we think it clear that portents of that type
may justify the physician in action he deems
medically warranted. The critical inquiry is
whether the physician responded to a sound
medical judgment that communication of the
risk information would present a threat to
the patient's well-being. 464 F.2d at 789.
(Citations omitted.)
An exception to the duty of disclosure has been
recognized and applied in cases where foreign objects were
left in the patient's body.

See, e.g., Hohenthal v. Smith,

114 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Mandelbaum v. Weil, 208
App. Div. 409, 203 N.Y.S. 289

(1924); VanSkike v. Potter,

53 Neb. 28, 73 N.W. 295 (1897).
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The Utah legislature has specifically recognized
such an exception to a physician's duty of disclosure.
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act provides that it
shall be a defense to any action against a physician
based upon alleged failure to obtain informed consent
if:

The health care provider, after considering
all of the attendant facts and circumstances,
used reasonable discretion as to the manner
and extent to which risks were disclosed,
if the health care provider reasonably
believed that additional disclosures could
be expected to have a substantial and adverse
effect on the patient's condition. Utah
Code Ann. §78-14-5 (2) (d) (1953).
In the present case, the trial court correctly
held that reasonable minds could not conclude that the
defendants were negligent in deciding against alarming
the plaintiff by advising her of the presence of the
surgical needle.

All of the physicians who testified

at trial agreed that the presence of the needle was not
har~ful

to the plaintiff and that any attempt to remove

it was not recommended.

Dr. Hicken's judgment that the

plaintiff was an emotional, nervous and worrisome individual
who might become unduly alarmed by knowledge of the presence
of the needle was clearly proven correct by the plaintiff's
own testimony.

Although all of the physicians testified

that the needle could not have been the cause of any pain
or discomfort, the plaintiff testified:
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Q

Now, since you found out about the
needle, have you been worried more
and upset more?

A

Oh, yes, I guess you worry. You have
to -- you have to watch it. So if I
watch it then the pain-- I don't move
then its not too bad, but when it moves,
I've got it.
I'm telling you, I got it.
I feel it.

Q

Have you been upset all the time ever
since you found out?

A
Well, I think I'm nervous, awful nervous.
(R 251-52)
Finally, the testimony is undisputed that the
plaintiff was hypertensive and that adverse psychosomatic
reactions and unreasonable concern about the condition
would be expected to further elevate her blood pressure.
Dr. Hicken's undisputed testimony may properly be
considered expert medical testimony that establishes the
medical standard with respect to disclosure that is
applicable to this case.

The medical standard so established

is that a competent and responsible medical practitioner
should not disclose information which might induce an
adverse psychosomatic or physiologic reaction in a highly
apprehensive patient.

Dr. Hicken's judgment in abiding

to that standard is beyond reproach under the facts
presented in this case.
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POINT III
THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE THAT DEFENDANTS'
CONDUCT PROXIMATELY CAUSED ANY DAMAGES
Plaintiff not only failed to produce sufficient
evidence of negligence or other breach of duty but
she also failed to prove that the conduct complained
of proximately caused any harm.
In Jackson v. Colston, 11 Utah 295, 209 P.2d 566
(1949), the Court considered an action in which the
plaintiff alleged she had received burns to her leg while
undergoing weight-reducing treatments administered by the
defendants.

Affirming a directed verdict in favor of

the defendants, the Court found it unnecessary to determine
whether the coctrine of res ipsa loquitur should have been
applied because the plaintiff had failed to show any causal
connection between the negligence and the injury complained
of.

Stating that it is fundamental that the burden rests

upon the plaintiff to establish the causal connection
between the injury and the alleged negligence of the
defendant, the Court stated:
In a proper case, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur may relieve the patient or-fh_e___
duty of showing specific acts of negligence,
but the authorities unanimously hold that
the causal connection between the alleged
negligent act and the injury ~s never presumed and that this is a matter the pla~ntiff
~s always requ~red to prove affirmatively.
Res ipsa loquitur is limited to the question
of whether the defendant was negligent - it
has nothing to do with the element of causation.
209 P.2d at 568.
(Emphasis added.)
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Similarly, in Huggins v. Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233,
310 P.2d 523 (1957), the Court affirmed the action
of the trial court which set aside a verdict for
plaintiff and dismissed the plaintiff's action.

In

that case, the plaintiff failed to introduce expert
testimony to establish the standard of care required
of the defendant and to establish a causal connection
between the conduct and injury complained of.

After

ruling that expert testimony was necessary to prove
negligence, the Court held:
Similar principles likewise apply to the
proximate causation of the injuries alleged.
As a general rule in a malpractice action,
expert testimony must be produced to show
that the injuries alleged were probably
caused by the lack of due care of defendan~.
In the absence of such evidence, there is
nothing upon which a jury can base its
finding on the proximate cause of the injury.
The evidence must be substantial and must,
in cases of this complex type, have foundation in expert medical testimony.
310 P.2d
at 526.
(Citations omitted.)
In order to reach the jury, the plaintiff was required
to prove with a reasonable medical probability that the
conditions of abdominal and back pain of which she complained were the result of the needle and not some other
cause.

Testimony that the needle "might have" or "could

have" caused harm is insufficient.

Denny v. St. Mark's

Hospital, 21 Utah 2d 189, 442 P.2d 944 (1968).
In the present case, the record is devoid of any
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evidence that the presence of the surgical needle
proximately caused the injuries and damage of which
the plaintiff complained.

To the contrary, the evidence

is undisputed that the presence of the needle is not
harmful to the plaintiff and could not be the cause
of any damage to her.

Dr. Hicken testified:

[F]rom my experience in such cases and
from being very conversant with literature on this subject, as I was a professor
and a teacher in medical schools, I knew
that a needle left in this particular
area was not particularly harmful to the
patient.
It is common knowledge that we
leave metal in the pelvis area very frequently.
Now, for example, in some of
our operations instead of using sutures
and ties to tie around bleeding blood
vessels, we have an instrument that we
go in there and we put a metal clip on the
blood vessel because it is easier to do,
it's quicker to do and it is innocuous.
(R 214)
Dr. A. James McAllister offered similar testimony in
answer to questions asked by the plaintiff's attorney:

Q

. . . a needle in the abdomen of a
patient is not trivial, is it?

A

Yes, I think in this case it is.

Q

Oh.

A

I think it is no different than a
Michael's clip or these staples that
we put through the bowel today to do
the actual anastomoses of the intestines
with.
These staples are made out of
the same material and they are sharp.

Q

Do you leave the points exposed?

A

Some of them.

Oh, well, I see.
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Q

On these clips?

A

Some of them.

Q

Are they capable of producing pain in a
patient?

A

Interestingly, sharp objects usually do
not produce pain in patient's abdomens.
There is a different nerve supply in the
-- within the abdomen and in the pelvis
than there is in the surface of the body.
They respond more to pressure than to
sharpness.
(R 233-34)

The plaintiff's present physician, Dr. Robert Maddock,
further testified that the abdominal pain of which the
plaintiff complained was secondary to a kidney stone
and was unrelated to the presence of the needle

(R 168).

The kidney stone problem was subsequently resolved and the
plaintiff expressed no other complaints of abdominal pain
(R 178).

Dr. Maddock also concluded that the needle was

probably not responsible for the plaintiff's back
(R 185).

pa~n

His judgments were confirmed when the plaintiff

exhibited no pain response at all to a probe of the needle
conducted during a pelvic examination Dr. Maddock subsequently performed (R 180).

In Dr. Maddock's judgment, the

needle is totally encapsulated and it is medically probable
that the needle will never move (R 182).
Finally, it was also established at trial that Dr.
Hicken's failure to inform the plaintiff of the presence
of the needle was inconsequential because all of the
physicians advised against any attempt to remove it.
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Dr. Robert Maddock and another consulting surgeon both
concluded that any surgery to remove the needle
would be dangerous because of its location between the
bladder and the rectum and, moreover, the chances of
the needle causing any damage were "very remote."

(R 183.)
In summary, all of the physicians who testified
at trial are in complete agreement that the needle has

not caused the plaintiff any harm and that it is medically
probable that it will cause no harm in the future.

In

light of such undisputed evidence, the trial court correctly held that there was nothing upon which a jury
could base its finding on the

pro~inate

cause of any

injury to the plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly held that the plaintiff
failed to prove foundational facts necessary to submit
the case to the jury on the theory of res ipsa loquitur.
Particularly in light of Dr. Hicken's explanation, the
trial court was compelled to hold that the question of
whether detachment of the needle from the forceps during
a surgical procedure of the kind performed on the plaintiff necessarily implies negligence is not a matter of
common knowledge among laymen.

In the absence of expert

testimony to support the plaintiff's contention, no
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Each of the physicians who testified at trial
also supported Dr. Hicken's judgment in deciding not
to disclose the presence of the needle to the plaintiff.
The incident was properly reported in the operative
report that became a part of the patient's medical
record, but no purpose beneficial to the patient would
have been served by further disclosures.

The evidence

was undisputed that no responsible medical practitioner
would have disclosed the incident to the plaintiff at
the risk of inducing severe and adverse psychosomatic
or physiologic reactions.
Finally, the trial court correctly held that no
evidence had been presented upon which the jury could
base a finding that the defendants' conduct proximately
caused any harm.

To the contrary, the testimony is

undisputed that the needle could not have caused the
ailments of which the plaintiff complained and that its
presence is as innocuous as metal staples that are now
commonly used in place of sutures.

The plaintiff's

physicians testified that the needle should not be removed
and that it is medically probable that it will never cause
any future harm.
For these reasons, the defendants respectfully urge
the Court to affirm the judgment of the Court below.
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DATED June 12, 1979.
Respectfully submitted,

H. SNOW
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521-9000
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